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Starting from the latter 1970s, international private lending to developing country 
governments mushroomed and largely took the form of a new type of medium-term loan 
arranged by syndicates of internationally active commercial banks. This was not the 
classic form of general-purpose medium to long-term lending to sovereigns, which was 
as bond issues floated domestically or in the international financial markets. The latter 
had been slow to recover from the two world wars and the Great Depression, although by 
the 1990s, foreign and international bond issues once again became major vehicles for 
foreign lending to developing country governments. The syndicated loan market did not 
disappear in the 1990s, but turned its attention mainly to major corporate financings, 
especially within the United States, but also in Europe and emerging economies in Asia 
and elsewhere. One reason perhaps for the lower level of interest in additional syndicated 
bank lending to many of the developing country governments was the unhappy 
experience with this type of lending in much of the 1980s, when many sovereign 
borrowers could not service their syndicated loans as contracted.  
 
In the final restructuring of the distressed bank debt in the early 1990s, the syndicated 
loans were converted into bonds. One loss in this shift was that the international 
mechanism that evolved to renegotiate sovereign debt to international banks – flawed, 
albeit operational – did not lend itself to being adapted to restructuring the bonds of debt-
crisis countries. Indeed, this is one of the reasons that proposals for a new sovereign debt 
restructuring mechanism were seriously considered in the early years of the present 
decade. As those proposals were stillborn and the problem is not resolved, it may be 
useful to look back at how the bank restructuring mechanism evolved, how it operated, 
and how it brought the 1980s crisis to a close. 
 
The first section of this chapter analyzes the development of international commercial 
bank financing of developing countries from the beginning of the seventies until the 
Mexican debt crisis erupted in 1982.  The next three sections outline the commercial debt 
restructuring programs, along with the institutional and legal reforms and economic 
adjustment programs, that were introduced in three stages to address the developing 
countries’ debt crisis (1982-1984, 1985-88, and 1989-94), under the aegis of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The final section takes stock of 
what was lost and gained as the era of syndicated bank lending to emerging economies 
was largely superseded by the return of sovereign bond financing. 
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2. BURGEONING INTERNATIONAL BANK FINANCING DURING 
THE 1970S 
 
The story begins with an important financial innovation in the 1960s in the newly 
emerging Eurodollar market, an unregulated market in mainly dollar-denominated loans 
and deposits made by banks outside the United States. That innovation was the 
international syndicated bank loan, wherein a major bank would undertake to raise a 
specified large amount of funds for a borrower but provide only a portion of the funds 
itself. The arranging bank or “lead bank” (or banks, as large loans could have a small 
group of lead banks and agents) would act as the manager of the prospective syndicate of 
participating banks, which it would recruit to the deal. While there would be one loan 
agreement to which all participants would subscribe, each bank would have its own 
security note with the borrower. (Later, this would allow banks to sell their participation 
on a secondary market.) The syndicate would last only as long as the loan, which could 
be anything from several months (or longer for short-term credits in a revolving credit 
facility) to over 10 years, but mostly under 5 years. The banks that became involved in 
these loans generally participated in multiple syndicates, and the largest banks developed 
the activity of lead manager as a major line of their international business. 
 
By the latter 1970s, the banks, increasingly flush with liquidity surpluses owing to the 
rapid growth of their deposits, established these loan syndicates for a growing number of 
developing and some developed country governments. From the beginning, the dominant 
international banks took advantage of their privileged market position in directing the 
sovereign credit syndications.  Indeed, the first ten leading commercial banks mobilized 
around two thirds of the sovereign syndicated loans granted by the first fifty banks during 
the period 1976-1977. Such concentration reflected the high degree of asset concentration in 
the international banking industry at the time and the oligopolistic competition between 
organized groups of suppliers facing a relatively elastic demand (United Nations, 1989). 
 
As from 1978, upon the persistence of the high liquidity situation, other international 
banks entered the new market.  The result of the increased competition was a reduction of 
interest margins and an extension of the maturities of the sovereign credits.  The banks 
also sought to diversify their activity by extending credit to relatively high-risk private 
entities. While the banks did not require a guarantee by the government of the borrower, 
they charged a high price relative to that on sovereign loans as compensation for the risk. 
The sovereign and private borrowings carried a variable interest rate comprised of a 
floating base interest rate – typically the London Inter-bank Offer Rate (LIBOR) on three 
or six-month loans in the currency of the loan, usually US dollars – plus a fixed “spread” 




With deepening competition during the period 1978-1982, syndicated loan concentration 
was significantly reduced, indeed, to the point that the first ten leading banks mobilized 
less than half the syndicated credits extended by the first fifty banks, and the average 
annual value of the gross flows mobilized by commercial banks for developing countries 
as a whole doubled (in real terms). At the same time, the spread over LIBOR on 
sovereign credits charged by commercial banks was reduced to one third of the 1977 
value by 1980-1981.  
 
Gradually, the criteria for credit extension as well as the borrowers’ objectives deemed 
eligible for financing became more flexible, and more financing was granted to the public 
sector. Of special significance was all-purpose financing for the central government 
general budget.  In the Latin American case, the public sector share in the stock of 
medium and long-term external commercial bank debt increased from 53% to 58% 
between 1975 and 1981, while the share of commercial bank debt increased from 49% to 
65% of the total stock of medium and long-term external government debt.  Meanwhile, 
the share of short-term debt in the total commercial debt balance increased from 21% to 
28% during this period (IDB, 1984). 
 
Along with market extension, diversification of borrowers and more competitive pricing, 
the new financial arrangements embodied new rules of an institutional nature and new 
modes of relationships of creditors and debtors. These included the following: 
 
i. The method for arranging the loans reflected the highly concentrated 
nature of the international banking industry at the time. To start, a 
borrowing country would select a lead bank to organize the syndication, 
usually supported by two or more co-leading banks for large loans. The 
syndicate managers would then mobilize the participation of numerous 
banks, each making individual contributions of a moderate size.  As 
Rieffel (2003) has stressed, the lead managers marketed the syndicated 
loans as “club” deals that they sold down, rather than sell participations 
into an open market, as with a security issue.  The loan participations 
nevertheless functioned like securities in that they entailed a sharing of 
risk among the lenders – and a diversification of risk if a bank joined 
different syndicates for different borrowing governments – compared to 
making a single very large loan to a single borrower.  
 
ii. The syndication agreements required new jurisprudence, embodied in 
contract clauses that bound the individual creditors into co-responsibility 
for the collective pursuit, while protecting their individual creditor 
interests, guaranteeing loyal competition, favoring the “voluntary nature” 
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of decisions that might be called for under the syndicate (as on 
restructuring terms) and providing a means for identification of the 
essential collective interest. The core clauses for dealing with potential 
repayment difficulties were the sharing, pari-passu, cross-default and 
negative pledge clauses. The sharing clause required sharing of payments by 
the borrower with all the syndicate members in proportion to their shares of 
the loan.  Pari-passu established that the borrower should treat the members 
of the present syndicate and all other similarly unsecured creditors of the 
government with the same priority for repayment in the event of debt-
servicing difficulties.  Cross default allowed any bank member of a 
syndicated loan to declare default if the borrower defaulted on another 
syndicated loan and impose as a condition that any member bank of the first 
syndicate should share any payment received from the borrower with the rest 
of the members of the second syndicate. The negative pledge was a promise 
by the borrower not to pledge any assets to another creditor (e.g., as 
collateral for a new loan) if that would reduce the security of the claims of 
the members of the present syndicate. 
 
iii. The basic postulates of a new theory of “restricted” sovereign immunity 
that became law in the United States and the United Kingdom during the 
period 1976-1978 were also incorporated into the loan agreements. The 
essential point was recognition that commercial borrowing by a 
government was a “non-sovereign act” and thus not protected by 
sovereign immunity. There had been different views on the proper scope 
of sovereign immunity and thus the legislative changes in the two 
countries under whose laws most syndicated sovereign lending would take 
place – and in whose courts most complaints might be brought – were a 
significant strengthening of the creditors’ legal position. 
 
iv. Regulatory changes were adopted by bank supervisory agencies of the 
major creditor countries in order to contain the new risks to which the 
banks were exposing themselves.  The United States, in particular, already 
in 1978, implemented several regulations referring to permissible risk 
concentration (for example, the maximum commitment to a specific 
borrower should not exceed 10% of a bank’s capital). In 1981, it set 
quantitative guidelines for minimum capital levels as a means to 
strengthen the supervision safeguards and support the competitive position 
of the banks. In 1983, it established “allocated transfer risk reserves” 
(ATRRs), which required banks to take specified reserves for each loan 
that was “impaired” because of transfer risk  (i.e., that the borrower might 
5 
 
not obtain the foreign exchange with which to make a payment falling 
due). The ATRRs were to be charged to current income and were not to be 
counted as part of bank capital.  However, due to increasing competitive 
pressures coming from commercial banks of other nationalities (in 
particular, Japanese, German and British) and their differing regulatory 
constraints, the American regulatory authorities opted to apply its 
prudential rules with “indulgence”.  It could not be otherwise explained 
why by the beginning of the eighties the largest American banks reached 
levels of exposure in Brazil and Mexico that, on average, exceeded 100% 




3. FIRST RESPONSE TO CRISIS: ECONOMIES CONTRACT AND 
BANKS ORGANIZE, 1982-1984 
 
With the outbreak of the debt crisis in Mexico in August 1982, the international financial 
community faced a new problem. The inability of governments to service their foreign 
debt obligations was not new. Indeed, the Paris Club had been helping to restructure 
sovereign foreign obligations since the 1950s. Governments had also defaulted many 
times in past periods on sovereign bonds held by foreigners. What was new here was the 
syndicated modality of the loans, which had made the amounts at issue very large both 
for the borrowers and the lenders. Indeed, a unique concern was that the lending banks 
that had made themselves highly vulnerable to bankruptcy through such lending were 
themselves central parts of the international payments system. The policy response 
entailed adoption of institutional, regulatory and procedural reforms, and the adjustment 
of the modalities, terms and conditions of the external financing of countries with debt 
problems. 
  
3.1. The overall approach 
 
Given the systemic threat of the crisis and the concern that the problems of Mexico could 
– and indeed did – become the problems of other countries that had borrowed heavily 
from the international banks, a globally concerted workout was warranted. The major 
multilateral organizations, the central banks and the economic authorities of the leading 
creditor countries and the major international commercial banks developed the initial 
policy response. The IMF took the lead in formulating and shepherding “rescue 
packages” for each crisis country, comprised of an IMF Stand-by adjustment program, a 
negotiated restructuring of debt repayment obligations, and the extension of new 
financing by the creditor banks that had exposure in the country, along with new official 
lending.  The central banks and official authorities of the major creditor countries, in 
particular, the United States Treasury and Federal Reserve with respect to American 
banks, acted to ensure the cooperation of the commercial banks.    
 
The problem was diagnosed as having arisen from temporary illiquidity in the crisis 
countries resulting from the late 1970s run up in spending by the countries and their 
governments, as well as owing to temporary conjunctural difficulties (weak demand for 
exports owing to a sharp recession in developed countries and very high nominal interest 
rates on outstanding commercial bank credits owing to anti-inflationary monetary 
tightening by the major economy countries). The result was balance-of-payments and 
fiscal deficits that suddenly could no longer be financed. The strategy for treating the 
problem aimed to re-establish as promptly as possible the external payment capacity of 
each crisis country. While an increase in the nominal exposure to the crisis countries of the 
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commercial banks would result from the “new money” loans, it was acknowledged that the 
net amount of financing from such creditors would be reduced significantly.  In fact, the net 
financial flow to Latin America declined from US$30.5 billion in 1981 to US$3.6 billion in 
1985.  
 
The balance-of-payments adjustment programs in the debtor countries focused on the 
reduction of imports to save foreign exchange, which could be effected quickly by 
restricting domestic demand. Meanwhile, the new financing by the commercial banks 
would help the debt-crisis governments make timely interest payments and thus prevent 
the banks from having to make impaired-loan reserves and provisions over a significant 
and increasing portion of their loan portfolios. At the same time, principal repayments on 
medium and long-term debt were postponed through rescheduling (short-term credit and 
inter-bank lines of credit were exempted). Both official credits from industrialized 
countries and bank loans were restructured, with a view to achieving a fair financial 
burden-sharing and avoiding that the costs of restructuring should be borne more by some 
creditors than others. The IMF oversaw the full process, periodically verifying that 
quantitative targets set in the adjustment program for each crisis country were met as a 
condition for the drawdown of various credit resources (the World Bank played a 
relatively minor role during this first phase of the crisis, which would change in the next 
phase when trying to address the “structural” roots of the crisis).  
 
3.2. Initial restructuring of commercial bank debt 
 
A specific scheme arose to carry out the restructuring of commercial bank credits, which 
preserved the regulations, modalities and institutional relations that had developed during 
the times of boom, while adding other novel ones. Central to the process was the 
formation by the leading banks of “bank advisory committees” (BACs) or London Clubs 
as an institution to legitimately represent all the creditor banks in the negotiation of 
rescue packages with the governments of the individual debtor countries, as well as to 
carry out the market validation of the financing packages provisionally agreed upon with 
the debtor country.  Following the approach of banks with their corporate borrowers, the 
documents of the bank advisory committees were legally binding, unlike the informal 
Paris Club agreements among government creditors.  A select group of law firms that had 
helped draft the original loan agreements played a decisive influence in designing the 
commercial bank workout process and in drafting the restructuring documents as well.   
Given the importance of the major banks to the stability of the international banking system, 
as well as the size of their exposure to the sovereign borrowers, there was a certain rationale 
to their taking a lead role in the formation of the BACs.  In fact, they more than 
proportionately subordinated the interests of the smaller banks to their own, as the leading 
banks controlled the committees of the most important debtor countries through a larger 
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representation than corresponded to their level of exposure. The major banks also limited 
the role of those referred to as rival banks.  On the other hand, the decisive influence of 
the leading banks in the debt restructuring process enabled them to defend the interests and 
needs of their respective national banks in the syndicates.  In the case of the Latin American 
countries, in particular, the American banks held half of the positions in the committees, a 
proportion that considerably exceeded the relative level of risk to which they were exposed.  
As an example it should be mentioned that Citibank (and specifically William Rhodes) 
acted as chairman of the bank advisory committees for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Peru and 
Uruguay from the early eighties to mid-nineties.     
 
This approach embodied a notionally limited form of cartelization, in that it separately 
brought together the lenders for each debtor. The preponderance of this “case-by-case 
approach” was considered an essential aspect of the management of the sovereign debt 
crisis. However, “case-by-case” impacted debtors and creditors differently. While debtors 
would have little stake in the outcome of succeeding negotiations of other debtors with their 
creditors, this was not the case for the creditors. As the same creditors could participate in 
several BACs, they paid a great deal of attention to the possible consequences of 
establishing precedents. This reflected a classic negotiation principle, as stated by 
Schelling (1963): “The advantage goes to the party who may determine with precision a set 
of other negotiations where its own position will be harmed if a concession in this one is 
made.” More precisely in the present context, as pointed out by Krugman (1985): “If 
creditors believe that leniency towards a debtor will generate demands from other debtors, 
the additional cost may make the creditors resist making concessions.” 
 
At the same time that the commercial bank creditors moved into cartelization, debtors 
were discouraged from forming their own organizations. Adducing the eminently 
financial nature of the problem, the defenders of the approach argued forcefully about the 
inconvenience, if not the danger for the stability of the system, if an organized group of 
debtors were established as official interlocutor in the negotiations. 
 
The requirement that each debtor country have an individualized adjustment program 
also worked to divide the debtors. The pre-eminence of the “conditionality principle” has 
a basis in orthodox banking practice, wherein discipline is taken as an emblem for the 
good debtor, as well as a necessary precondition for new financing on market competitive 
terms.  However, the emphasis on differences and individual national interests of each 
debtor – in effect, the argument that “one size does not fit all” – also impeded the 
recognition of a collective interest of the debtor countries. A collective consciousness 
among debtors was further discouraged by highlighting the adjustment behavior of 
certain debtors as worthy of emulation and providing them a preferential treatment, even 
more favorable than what a sound prescription of their credit condition would dictate, or, 
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otherwise, punishing the conduct of other debtors, beyond what was merited according to 
the principle of “correspondence”.  All this in order to teach a lesson through penalties – 
even excessive if the case would be – for “bad” debtors, while favorably rewarding, 
sometimes excessively, other debtors that may not have necessarily been the best or the 
most outstanding, if this would help preserve the stability of the market regime. 
 
The coalescing of debtor governments into a bloc was also impeded by the separate 
negotiations needed for restructuring different forms of debt, falling into at least four sub-
categories: the international commercial banks, the multilateral creditors (concerning 
multilateral banks and IMF), the bilateral or official creditors (i.e., governments and official 
agencies of the creditor countries), and the private credit market (referring to non-financial 
entities having claims on the government, such as suppliers). The basic premise throughout 
the 1980s was that each and every one of the agreements with the multilateral entities (in 
particular, the IMF and the multilateral banks) had to be fully upheld and their financial 
terms excluded from any debt restructuring.  That is, multilateral debt was treated as senior 
to commercial debt, with no possibility of rescheduling even if the limited external payment 
capacity of the debtor country would otherwise warrant it.  
 
The outcome of this process in the initial years 1983-1984 was that 53 debt restructuring 
packages with commercial banks were negotiated (not necessarily signed in the same 
period) by developing debtor countries, which rescheduled repayments over 7-8 years at an 
interest rate that carried an average spread over LIBOR of close to 1.9%, plus an average net 
commission of 1.1% of the value of the restructured debt (World Bank, 1988). During that 
same biennium, outlays of US$23.4 billion were provided to the debtor countries on account 
of new financing as a component of the debt rescheduling packages. While buying time, the 
rescheduling agreements and new loans turned out to be costly for the debtor countries, as 
the profile of their foreign debt further deteriorated over the period.  
 
The leading banks, meanwhile, succeeded in improving their risk position thanks in part 
to an ex-post facto concession that gave some form of debtor government guarantee or 
special treatment to the high-risk non-guaranteed loans that a number of these banks had 
made to the private sector, as noted above. Moreover, the American banks as a whole 
benefited from a reduction of their exposure relative to other banks, as they did not 
contribute to the “new” financing in the same proportion as their share in the stock of 
commercial bank debt. 
 
This latter point warrants some explanation.  Under the premise that the new financing 
requested would help the debtor to reestablish its payment capacity, every creditor would 
evidently desire that it take place, although it would benefit from the new financing even 
if it did not itself contribute new resources. Banks assuming such behavior are referred to 
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as “free riders” (and banks that did not abstain from providing new money but provided less 
than their proportional share could be called “cheap riders”).  The most likely candidates to 
actually become free riders were the banks that were the least exposed in terms of their share 
in the debt of the country with insufficient payment capacity, as well as in terms of the share 
of their own capital at risk. These would have been, in general, the smaller and less active 
banks in the international market, which included a number of regional US banks. As every 
bank would have an incentive to be a free rider, intervention “from the outside” would be 
required to impose the collective interest, although the smaller banks would be less 
susceptible to the pressure, which could (and did) take various forms. 
 
The clauses in the syndication agreements noted earlier did not describe how to bring 
about an adequate collective decision on “new money”. Instead, there was extra-
contractual pressure to cooperate on this matter, as on the package as a whole. First, the 
creditor countries’ governments, multilateral organizations and leading banks served as 
persuasive voices – as “rationalizing entities” – for the collective interest. In this sense, 
the IMF stood out as the most suitable institution to exercise a “catalytic” function, a 
position conferred on it as the central entity “responsible” for the adequate functioning of 
the international financial system. Similarly, the leadership role of the large banks seemed 
natural in light of their privileged position in the global financial market and their business 
and financial relationships with the smaller banks.  At a second rung of influence, the 
taxation and regulatory regimes of the creditor countries could be brought to bear or 
modified to encourage the banks to participate.  
 
The strictly involuntary or “forced” – albeit informal – character of the treatment of the 
commercial bank debt of the sovereigns with payment capacity problems was apparently 
essential. As Rieffel (2003) argues,  
 
“Senior finance officials also exerted pressure at key points in the negotiating 
process. The IMF managing director would contact a BAC chairman on occasion 
to stress the implications of specific terms for the debtor country’s recovery 
prospects. [Group of 7] finance ministers and their deputies would more often 
engage in arm-twisting with BAC chairmen or members.  The views of certain 
governors and senior staff members of the Federal Reserve Board were conveyed 
occasionally and were given great weight by banks generally.”  
 
Finally, it may be noted that while this discussion has focused on the need and approach 
to minimize self-interested actions by individual banks that were members of syndicates, 
other creditor banks had also granted individual loans.  However, owing to pari passu 
and other clauses in the loan agreements, there was no point in trying to settle their 
claims independently, as they would have had to share the proceeds with the others.   
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Indeed, they would be “isolated” from the rest of the banking community unless, as 
counterpart to their proper cooperation in the success of the package, obligations to them 
were included with those of the rest of bank creditors under equitable conditions under 
the clauses and in the contractual terms established in the rescheduling agreements.  
 
In sum, the initial international treatment of the debt crisis saw international bank finance 
transit from a market-oriented regime to one characterized by the cartelization of the 
creditor banks under official oversight and the treatment of each crisis country’s sovereign 
debt on a separate (case-by-case) basis, albeit under a market-based approach. It would have 
been preferable to avoid outright crises and pursue a mutually agreed voluntary restructuring 
between creditor banks and the debtor country when the alternative for the banks was not to 
be paid under the initial conditions. When that could not be achieved due to the persistence 
of disagreement between banks and the debtor country, involuntary restructuring had to be 
imposed by third parties. The need arose for invoking various modalities of “persuasion” 
and exercise of “majority power” so as to ensure the primacy of the systemic interest over 
the diverging particular interests.  In this way, international cooperation among the major 




4. THE SECOND STAGE: THE BAKER PLAN AND STRUCTURAL 
ADJUSTMENT, 1985-1988 
 
Proponents of the initial strategy did not expect continued unsatisfactory growth of the 
world economy, the persistence of high real rates of interest on international debt, the 
recurrence of external shocks in the debtor economies, the modest amount of new 
financing by the commercial banks, the flaws in the economic policies adopted by 
indebted countries, and thus the inability of debtor countries under difficulty to recover 
adequate rates of growth and strengthen their payment capacity. With the aim of 
preventing the failed first stage from turning into a widespread debtor moratorium, some 
modifications of the strategy for managing the debt crisis had to be introduced.  The 
“Baker Plan” was thus announced in October 1985. 
 
4.1. The approach of the Baker Plan and its limitations 
 
Developed by the US Secretary of the Treasury, James A. Baker III, the plan began with 
the acknowledgement that the debt-servicing difficulties of the major crisis countries – 15 
of which were identified – were of a more “structural” character than had been accepted 
in the first stage, when temporary austerity and debt relief were the policy focus. 
Accordingly, the plan called for a triad of requirements in order to restore the capacity of 
the highly indebted countries to service their outstanding debt and return to 
creditworthiness, namely, the recovery of adequate rates of growth that are sustained, the 
adoption of “structural” reforms, and access to enough financing to carry out the other 
parts of the program. 
  
The plan built on the basic dimensions of the international strategy for managing the 
crisis that had developed in the first stage: 
 
i. The multilateral character of crisis management would be retained, albeit 
with strengthened coordination between the IMF and the World Bank in 
order to:  
(a) guarantee the proper reconciling and sound balance between the short-
term adjustment policies promoted by the former and the structural 
reforms supported by the latter, and to avoid harmful contradictions and 
inconsistencies between the policies embodied in the loan agreements 
negotiated with these two institutions;  
(b) formulate the details of the “financial support and economic growth 
promotion packages;” and  
(c) reinforce the institutional authority of the multilateral entities to 
conduct the new strategy, so as to reverse the loss of confidence and 
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growing hostility toward the IMF resulting from the unsatisfactory 
outcomes of the short-term adjustment programs it had promoted in the 
first phase. 
  
ii. The “conditionality principle” would continue to be applied in the sense 
that progress in the application of policies and carrying out of reforms 
negotiated with IMF and the Bank would be monitored and pre-agreed 
benchmarks would have to be achieved for release of promised financial 
support. The institutional and regulatory scheme in the Baker Plan thus 
maintained the type of relationship that arose in the first stage between the 
creditor bloc, the Bretton Woods institutions and creditor governments on 
one side and each of the debtor developing countries individually on the 
other. 
 
iii. The case-by-case approach was confirmed as a key element of the debt 
management strategy.  Coupled with the coordinated position of the 
community of private creditors, industrialized country governments and 
the multilateral entities, as noted above, this amounted to the determined 
opposition to the formation of an organized group (or cartel) of debtors. 
This, in turn, ruled out the formalization of a political dialogue between 
creditors and debtors around the debt issue. 
  
iv. The bank advisory committees were fully accepted as the legitimate 
institutional mechanism to represent the bank creditors of a sovereign 
debtor in crisis. They would remain throughout the crisis as the key actors 
on the commercial bank side in the formulation, negotiation and 
management of the financial packages. 
 
v. The involuntary or “forced” character of the commercial bank “new-
money” financing of debt-crisis countries continued as before, upon the 
unwillingness of the international banks to return to new sovereign lending 
on a voluntary basis.  The return to normal international private financing 
for the crisis countries was implicitly acknowledged to be remote, as the 
countries were said to face structural difficulties that made completion of 
adjustment more complex than initially foreseen. 
 
Even though the institutional basics of the strategy followed during the first stage were 
preserved in the Baker Plan, innovations were needed to deal with consequences of the 
structural character, and not merely short-term nature, of the prescribed reforms and the 
desire to recover adequate and sustained economic growth rates. In addition to the 
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coordination problem among the key players that had to be addressed, including making 
room for a larger role for the World Bank, there was a question of who would provide the 
necessary financing. In fact, new commercial bank financing was becoming progressively 
scarce.  Thus, for example, while outlays of US$ 23.4 billion of “new” credit were made 
during the 1983-1984 biennium (as part of 53 re-scheduling packages negotiated during 
the period), only US$ 8.4 billion was provided in the 1986-1987 biennium (World Bank, 
1988).  
 
As the “new money” problem was intimately tied to the rescheduling negotiations, one 
answer was to seek to lock the banks into longer-term agreements. A multi-year 
rescheduling modality was thus introduced and the repayments terms were eased. From 
rescheduling loan payments over 8 years with 3 years’ grace, paying an interest rate of 
1.9% over LIBOR on the rescheduled amounts, which had been agreed, on average, for 
the debt re-scheduled during 1983-1984, the terms grew to rescheduling over 10.5 years 
with 4 years’ grace and a 1.4% margin, on average, for the multiyear agreements 
negotiated during the 1985-1986 biennium. Additionally, the average annual amount of 
rescheduled debt increased from US$55 billion during the period 1983-1985 to US$80 
billion in the period 1986-1988. 
 
However, the commercial bank debt renegotiations were becoming increasingly difficult, 
as different competitive strategies and regulatory and tax pressures affected the banks in 
the creditor blocs differently. The competitive environments, as well as regulatory ones, in 
some of the industrialized countries also differed, particularly between Western Europe and 
the United States. There is no other explanation for the fact that by the end of 1986 medium-
sized and small US banks had built reserves of less than 20% of their exposure to the highly 
indebted countries and the 15 major American banks had taken reserves in proportions 
ranging between 20 and 35%, while the reserves of the continental European banks were 
between 35 and 70%.  
 
A key question, then, was how to mobilize additional financial resources for the debt-crisis 
countries. One answer was increased financing by the World Bank itself. The average 
annual amount of the loans committed increased from US$ 3.5 billion during the period 
1982-1984 to US$ 6.0 billion during the period 1985-1988. However, the effort was 
insufficient and the Bank became a net recipient of funds from the 15 countries included 
in the Plan (World Bank, 1989). Similarly the 15 countries turned into “net capital 
exporters” to IMF during each of the years 1986 to 1988, for a total net payment to the 
Fund of around US$5 billion. 
 
What then about private sources of financing? At least three kinds of incentives could be 
conceived to stimulate such financing by private actors, namely:   
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(a) The (partial) displacement of the risk of non-payment to an economic agent 
different from the one providing the financial resources (traditionally, this would 
mean a creditor government guarantee, but by the 1980s it could also mean 
derivative contracts to transfer specified risks to specialized market players);   
(b) The debt-for-equity swap, through which the credit nature of the liabilities is 
changed into an ownership share in an investment, such as a privatized state 
enterprise (see below); and  
(c) The issuing of notes, securities with floating interest, or any other security of 
such type, either for sale to investors or for swapping with bank creditors, these 
being clearly different financial mechanisms than the traditional banking credit in 
terms of status, nature and economic and legal character of the creditor (which no 
longer are bank entities, as non-financial legal entities and even natural persons 
could be included). Of these modalities, the debt-for-equity swap was frequently 
used in this period. An estimate of the transactions volume traded until 1987 was 
around US$7.5 billion, which was nearly 3% of the stock of the commercial bank 
debt of the highly indebted developing countries (Morgan Guaranty Trust, 1988).  
 
Taking the different sources of finance together, however, the outcome was contrary to 
one of the basic requirements of the Baker Plan: an adequate financing of the adjustment 
programs of the highly indebted countries. On the other hand, the commercial banks did not 
fair badly. As a consequence of a marked reduction of their new financing, debt swaps 
and other transformations of liabilities, the commercial banks as a whole noticeably 
reduced their nominal exposure to the 15 countries included in the Baker Plan.  More 
precisely, during the first three years of the plan, such reduction reached about US$ 12.4 
billion, equivalent to 4.8% of the debt owed to the commercial banks at the end of 1985 
when the plan started.  
 
Meanwhile, attitudes towards cooperation in some of the highly indebted countries had 
begun to change. In the case of Latin America, in June 1984 the most heavily indebted 
countries established a regional consultation organ, known as the “Cartagena Consensus” 
(Consenso de Cartagena).  Its purpose was to exchange experiences and reach concrete 
collective positions regarding the debt problem, without intending to become a “club of 
debtors” that would carry out joint negotiations with the international creditors.  
 
Notwithstanding its potential as a collective organ for most of the highly indebted 
middle-income countries (i.e., excluding Nigeria and the Philippines), the Consensus 
lacked influence at a formal political level in the international arena, providing a lot to 
reflect upon.  It was in response to this point that in November 1987, the presidents of 
eight of the member countries of the Cartagena Consensus decided to formalize a new 
consultation mechanism, referred to as the Group of the Eight, which became a substitute 
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for the Consensus in practice. 
 
In reality, however, no effective bloc of debtor countries arose, despite the deepening of 
the debt crisis. The international strategy continued to give differential and discriminatory 
treatment to individual debtor countries.  The financial packages continued to be 
conditional on policy formulated with the World Bank and with the usual involvement of 
IMF and the bank advisory committees in their specification and with financial flows 
conditional on performance in implementing reforms.  Moreover, a sequential pattern for 
the treatment of debtor countries on a separate, case-by-case approach was adopted. First, 
a country was selected that, aside from being highly indebted, would be distinguished as 
strategic at the economic and geopolitical level and also “eligible” due to its commitment 
to observe the conditionality on its economic policy reform and adjustment. This role had 
been played by Mexico until this stage, then by other countries, in particular, Argentina 
and Chile. Brazil also played this role during the first stage but not in this second one. 
Finally, with a precedent established, it would be extended to the remaining countries that 
would require it. 
 
In all, it is outstanding that during the period 1985-1987, not only were the basic goals 
stipulated in the Baker Plan not realized, but, on the contrary, conflicts at the interior of the 
bloc of creditors sharpened due to differences in national regulatory, taxation and 
accounting regimes and to divergences in lending patterns among creditor banks of different 
countries (World Bank, 1988), as well as in reaction to worsening debtor-creditors relations. 
Debtor countries’ financing difficulties intensified and arrears accumulated as “opposition in 
debtor countries to debt service rose since the costs of debt service were high and the 
benefits seemed remote” (World Bank, 1989). The “institutional power” of the creditor 
governments and the multilateral institutions to safeguard the solidarity among the 
commercial banks weakened and, as a consequence of all this, the outlook for the debt 
problem became even more uncertain.  Despite this, certain principles and basics of the 
market practice still prevailed, as well as the negotiation structure with the debtor countries 
and the basic strategy for sovereign debt management that had been supported since the 
beginning of the debt crisis. 
 
4.2. Loss of confidence and the beginning of debt reduction 
 
As the World Bank (1989) pointed out, “Towards the end of 1987, after two years of 
mediocre progress in the highly indebted countries and of defensive actions on the part of 
the commercial banks, it is evident that the expectations generated by the strategy 
launched in 1985 [had] not been satisfied.” The commercial banks, whose claims on the 
highly indebted countries were looking less and less viable, proposed improving the 
financial terms of the multiyear restructurings in successive rounds of renegotiation of the 
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debt.  Of course, the “softening” of terms offered did not extend to the small debtor 
countries (for example, Honduras, Malawi); neither were they uniformly available to the 
larger highly indebted countries.  Indeed, while in August 1988 Brazil obtained a 20-year 
restructuring, Chile had obtained only 15 years in April 1988. Nor were the restructurings 
sufficient to cover the external financing requirements of the indebted countries.   
 
A perspective on the generally deteriorating confidence in the prospects for the crisis 
countries and their external debt can be gotten from the secondary market that arose as a 
way for the banks to swap or sell their shares in the syndicated loans owed by debt-crisis 
countries. This market increasingly provided a way for banks (usually with small 
holdings) to exit the crisis-country debt market by selling their participations to other 
financial institutions, but it also introduced a mechanism by which governments could 
buy back their loans.  The latter required the approval of the lending banks in each 
affected syndicate, which over time was increasingly given. Indeed, debt reduction raised 
the probability of repayment to the remaining creditors. From the debtor government’s 
perspective, the discount on their debt in the secondary market made repurchase 
attractive, although even more so was introduction of debt-for-equity swaps in which 
direct investors would buy the debt claims on the secondary market and share the 
discount with the government in exchange for local currency for a desired capital 
investment (charitable organizations also began to capitalize on this opportunity with 
“debt for nature”, “debt for children” and other debt-reduction swaps, wherein the debtor 
government promised to redirect a portion of the local currency equivalent of the foreign 
payments saved into specified social and environmental programs).   
 
The secondary market acquired progressively more significance after 1985, both as a way 
for banks to adjust their loan portfolios and for debtor governments to reduce their 
obligations.  Transactions reached around US$ 40 billion during the period 1985-1988. 
The average discount on the debt of the 15 countries in the Baker Plan was 30% in mid 1986 
and 35% in mid 1987, but by the end of 1988 it was edging toward 60% (Morgan Guaranty 
Trust, 1988).  Of course, the discount varied among countries. Furthermore, the 
“contamination” effect was said to reduce the value of the debt of a country if it were 
located in a “neighborhood” with crisis countries (in Latin America in particular).  
 
Using the secondary market to reduce their outstanding obligations, the value of debt 
conversions of developing countries increased from US$ 1.3 billion in 1985 to US$ 4.7 
billion in 1987 and reached approximately US$ 15.0 billion in 1988. In addition, in 1988 
four Latin American countries negotiated important packages of debt reduction with their 
bank creditors, with an eye on the prices for their debt in the secondary market. Bolivia 
repurchased US$ 335 million of its debt with the commercial banks (40% of its balance) at 
an average discount of 89%.  Mexico was able to “drawdown” US$ 3.67 billion from its 
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commercial sovereign debt, at an average discount of 30.25%, using a technique that would 
become central to the Brady Plan, the final stage of the 1980s debt crisis (see below); i.e., 
Mexico swapped the bank debt for US$ 2.56 billion in newly issued tradable securities 
backed by United States treasury bonds it had purchased.  Chile repurchased US$ 300 
million of its long-term commercial bank debt at an average discount of 44%, using US$168 
million of its international reserves. In addition, Brazil agreed a package of $62 billion in 
rescheduled debt and $5.2 billion in new funds, which included several important debt 
reduction mechanisms. Among them were “debt-equity conversions at 100 percent face 
value (that) would further result in a reduction of debt stock by $1.8 billion over a three year 
period” (World Bank, 1988). As was to be expected, the discounts at which some countries 
could negotiate to reduce their debt were significantly inferior to those that were registered 
at the time in the secondary market itself.  To illustrate, the discount obtained by Mexico for 
the reduction of part of its debt, 30.25% as noted above, could be compared to the secondary 
market discount at that time (second quarter, 1988), which amounted to 53.3%. 
 
There is no doubt that the incorporation into the menu of debt restructuring options of 
such innovative mechanisms and modalities as noted above for the voluntary reduction of 
the debt helped debtor countries, in particular as from the end of 1986.  However, the 
scope for debt reduction through such processes was restricted by the limited willingness 
of many creditors to make their claims eligible for swaps and purchase and the limited 
discount they would accept. More precisely, by the end of 1988 the 15 countries of the 
Baker Plan had foreign debts of US$ 500 billion, of which US$ 240 billion corresponded to 
medium and long-term commercial bank debt.  Assuming that the commercial banks would 
“voluntarily” reduce the value of this type of debt by 30%, on average, and assuming an 
annual LIBOR rate of 9% and a 1% margin over the LIBOR rate as an average interest rate 
on the outstanding debt, the 15 countries of the Baker Plan could see their interest payments 
reduced by US$7 billion per year. This was not enough. As stated by Morgan Guaranty 
Trust (1988),  
 
“This savings may hardly be the answer to any of the debt or growth problems.  It 
represents less than 1% of the GDP for the 15 countries as a whole and not even the 
annual amount of financing which the Baker Plan had budgeted for the commercial 
banks.  The average load of the interest in their exports would descend from 26% to 
22% and the foreign debt to exports ratio would be reduced from 315% to 270%.” 
 
Therefore, to progress on the treatment of the debt problem and, at the same time, ensure 
appropriate economic growth in the debtor countries in the medium and long term, more 
was needed than the Baker Plan had offered.  The Baker Plan had bought time for debtor 
countries to adjust their economies, for the commercial banks to build up reserves against 
their exposure to debtor developing countries (Rieffel, 2003), and for the creditor bloc to 
19 
 
organize a favorable burden-sharing arrangement, at least from their perspective. Still 
needed was deeper debt-reduction, strengthened financial support from multilateral 
entities, creditor governments and their official export agencies, and, not least, reform of 
the institutional, regulatory and procedural arrangements in the international financial 




5. THE THIRD STAGE: THE BRADY INITIATIVE FOR DEBT 
REDUCTION 
 
Nicholas Brady, who succeeded Baker as US Treasury Secretary in 1988 and who came 
from a long career in private banking on Wall Street, introduced the initiative that carries 
his name on March 10, 1989. The new plan, building on the principles of the Baker Plan, 
continued to aim to spur economic growth and return the debt crisis countries to financial 
solvency. It added, however, a mechanism for bringing about significant reductions of 
bank debt, which was increasingly acknowledged as essential if countries were to move 
out from under their debt crises.  
 
5.1. Why a new initiative was needed 
 
Banks had been reluctant to acknowledge that their developing country borrowers would 
unlikely ever be able to fully service their debt, despite several years of rescheduling and 
“new money” loans.  But that was the case. Also, the magnitude of developing country 
commercial bank debt was still large enough to threaten the international financial 
system. In particular, at the beginning of 1988, the 10 largest banks of the United States 
had loans outstanding to developing countries that amounted on average to more than 
85% of their primary capital and close to 8% of their total assets. Furthermore, their 
average exposure to these countries net of loan reserves as a ratio to shareholders’ equity 
exceeded 2.15 (Huizinga, 1989).  
 
By the late 1980s, moreover, it had become obvious to shareholders in the banks, to bank 
supervisors and regulators, and to the international policy community that outright 
reduction in debt and debt servicing was required. And yet, certain factors impeded the 
direct negotiation of agreements between countries and their banks to actually reduce 
those obligations. 
 
Consider first what one might assume to be the simplest case, an individual credit granted 
by only one commercial bank. It might be expected that nothing would interfere with a 
unilateral decision by one of the parties to alter the contractual terms in favor of its 
counterparty, as long as the change would not contravene overall sovereignty principles 
or the voluntary nature of such actions. In this sense, a debt or debt-service reduction 
jointly agreed between the individual creditor bank and the debtor country could be 
expected to fall into the same legal, institutional and financial status as the original credit 
arrangement.  
 
However, if the country also had syndicated loans and if their documentation contained 
the specific standard clauses mentioned in the beginning of this chapter (i.e., cross 
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default, sharing, pari passu, and negative pledge), then the banks in the syndicates would 
have had a voice in the transaction, even though they were not directly party to it. The 
overriding concern of the syndicate members would be that nothing in the bilateral deal 
put them at a disadvantage. If, as part of the bilateral deal, the bank creditor were granted 
a privileged status with respect to collecting on the remaining debt (as through some type 
of guarantee or if there were some preferential regulatory treatment of the bank), then the 
other creditors could assert their interest in the arrangement. Moreover, any benefits or 
advantages derived by the individual bank creditor from its bilateral deal would have had 
to be shared with all the banks in proportion to their loan exposures in each of the 
syndicated loan deals. In addition, owing to this type of concern, the bilateral deal would 
have had to be approved unanimously or with the majority provided for in the original 
syndication agreements. 
 
The same impediments would arise for comparable arrangements between the debtor 
government and participants in any of the syndicated loans themselves. Under these 
circumstances, governments could be stopped from repurchasing their own debt. Indeed, 
until it was agreed to suspend these clauses under the Brady Initiative, only two 
commercial debt repurchase agreements had been negotiated in the Latin American 
countries and for very modest amounts (US$335 million in the case of Bolivia and US$300 
million in the case of Chile).  
 
Trading in the secondary market up to this point had focused almost exclusively on 
transactions between different international commercial banks or between creditor banks 
and other types of financial entities (for example, intermediaries, financial groups, brokers). 
These transactions transferred the debtor’s obligations among different creditors and did not 
modify the condition of the credit per se. It allowed banks to rebuild their portfolio, reduce 
their exposure in countries with payment problems, redirect their financial specialization and 
redefine the geographic pattern of their functioning. Moreover, as the new owners of the 
debt would usually have purchased their claims at a discount and for speculative purposes, 
they would be less inclined to extend new financing as part of subsequent rescheduling 
negotiations. In other words, the secondary market was endogenously developing in a way 
that made continuation of the previous debt strategy increasingly problematical. 
 
5.2. Elements of the debt reduction strategy 
 
The Brady Plan acted on the possibility that effective debt restructuring agreements could 
result from voluntary market-based negotiations between each debtor and its creditors, 
once freed from contractual and policy impediments. The Initiative sought to take 
account of both the sovereignty of the debtors and the private interests of the creditors, 
under what it saw to be equitable and market-driven conditions for the various agents. 
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But it also recognized that the problem was too big for the market to absorb by itself 
without a certain intervention from outside of the market. This would take the form of 
stronger official international support in a context of more effective domestic economic 
adjustment and growth programs. Brady thus proposed that the following four sets of 
priority actions be undertaken as part of an enhanced international cooperation program:  
 
i. Debtor countries would apply sound economic policies, deepen their 
structural economic reforms and promote growth, including through the 
adoption of policies to raise investment, strengthen domestic savings and 
encourage the return of flight capital;  
 
ii. The creditor commercial banks would agree to temporary exemptions (for 
three years) of the “sharing” (or “prorating”) and “negative pledge” 
clauses in loan contracts, so as to make it easier for a debtor government 
and its banks to negotiate a menu of restructuring terms from which 
different banks could choose comparable debt or debt-service reduction;  
 
iii. The governments of creditor countries would remove obstacles of an 
accounting, actuarial, tax, regulatory and procedural nature to their banks 
being able to participate in the new debt or debt-service reduction 
agreements; and 
 
iv. The international community would offer financial support to debt-crisis 
countries, either directly (as in the rescheduling of government and official 
export agency loans through the Paris Club and providing additional 
official financing) or indirectly (as in guaranteeing interest payments on 
restructured bank debt). 
 
The first set of actions pertained to burden sharing with the creditors, as well as concerns 
for structural adjustment. While the Brady Initiative accepted the need for debt and debt-
service reduction, it was sympathetic to the views of the creditor bloc that the economic 
burden be placed to the extent possible on the debtor countries. To this end, debtor 
countries had to satisfy a set of economic policy conditions and imperatives in order to be 
eligible for the initiative. On the other hand, the promise of additional international 
support (the fourth set of actions) would recognize the need for a more equitable 
distribution of the costs of adjustment than in the past. 
 
The second set of actions addressed the impediments caused by the contractual clauses 
noted above. By removing them, it was expected that negotiations would follow on a case-
by-case basis without any agent interfering that was alien to the parties that were 
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contractually linked. Bank advisory committees, representing all the international creditor 
commercial banks of each country, were once again deemed the institutionally legitimate 
body to negotiate the exemptions, and to be the counterparty of the debtor country’s 
government in negotiating the voluntary operations of debt and debt-service reduction. In 
this way, it was said, the debt agreement could be tailored to the individual country 
situation. Also, the voluntary nature of the negotiations was considered important, in 
particular to win the cooperation of the banks in participating in the final debt agreement. 
 
The third set of actions was meant to change the regulatory environment so as to 
legitimate the reduction of the face value of the debt in light of the general perception of 
the low-probability of the full repayment of the loans. Priority was also accorded to 
policy modifications by different regulatory authorities, so as to facilitate comparable 
debt or debt-service reduction by banks from different countries. An important step 
toward systemic improvement in this regard was the adoption by the Basel Committee in 
1988 of the first set of common capital adequacy standards for internationally active 
banks, which were recommended for adoption by the authorities in the major financial 
centers.  
 
The final set of actions reiterated the international and multilateral character of the 
treatment of the sovereign debt crisis. Besides quantitatively adding financial support, 
emphasis was put on financial innovation (in particular, conversion of bank debt to bonds 
with partial guarantees of repayment), as well as making more flexible and speeding up the 
process for determining debtor country financial gaps (and thus required debt relief). An 
additional concern was to strengthen the financial position of the multilateral entities. As 
with the Baker Plan, the importance of close coordination between the IMF and the World 
Bank was also emphasized.  
 
In sum, the fundamental contribution of the Brady Initiative consisted in:  (a) giving 
sufficient legitimacy to the voluntary reduction of commercial bank debt or debt service, (b) 
organizing the debt reduction as a voluntary market practice through the establishment of 
regulatory, institutional and procedural schemes propitious for the free decision of the agents 
participating in the market, and (c) making the program operational as a financial 
mechanism and providing support to the programs of structural adjustment.  
 
5.3. How much debt reduction? 
 
By December 1990, the first four operations of commercial bank debt reduction under the 
framework of the Brady Plan had been arranged: Philippines (January, 1990), Mexico 
(February, 1990), Costa Rica (May, 1990) and Venezuela (August, 1990).  In February 1991 
an additional agreement on Uruguayan debt was adopted.  Subsequently, the packages for 
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Argentina and Brazil, two of the most important debtors in the Third World, would be 
detailed. In each of the agreements, the bank advisory committees effectively negotiated 
with the government a “menu” of alternative but comparable options, from which the 
participating banks selected and thereby made concrete their contributions to the financial 
package. The understanding was that all banks would participate to the same degree, if in 
different ways.  
 
Some of the main characteristics of the agreements are worth mentioning, namely:  (a) the 
full amount of the eligible bank debt that was not extinguished was converted into freely 
tradable bonds, losing their status as traditional sovereign bank debt; (b) the bonds, which 
reflected a discount on the nominal value of the bank debt or a reduced interest rate, 
benefited from special collateral on the principal (i.e., they were backed by thirty-year zero 
coupon bonds of the United States Treasury), purchased by the debtor governments with a 
combination of their official reserves, IMF credit, and loans of the World Bank and Inter-
American Development Bank; (c) the banks were given the possibility to recapture some of 
the discount off face value if certain positive developments ensued, up to an annual limit of 
3% of the amount of the debt reduction and as from a specified date; (d) as calculated by the 
World Bank (1989, 1990, 2002), the net discount of the commercial bank debt was 35% for 
the Mexican arrangement (on US$48 billion debt treated), 50% for the Philippines (on 
US$5.7 billion debt treated), 30% for Venezuela (on US$20.6 billion) and, given their 
particular conditions, 80% for Costa Rica (on US$1.6 billion), which compares with 
discounts prevailing in the secondary market of 60%, 52%, 65% and 87%, respectively. 
 
As Cline (1995) has argued, by the end of 1995 the Brady Plan write-downs amounted to 
about one third of the US$190 billion of bank claims treated in thirteen countries, albeit 
equivalent to only 15% of the total external debt of these countries. In this regard, it appears 
that the psychological impact of this forgiveness was bigger than its financial impact, as new 
private flows returned and in some cases surged into the countries.  Including four more 
deals that were completed during 1996 and 1997 (on US$20 billion of debt treated), the 
overall approximate discount was less than 40% on US$211 billion of commercial bank 
debt treated in seventeen deals under the Brady Plan during the period 1990-1997.  
 
In light of the sharp difference between the realized commercial bank and overall debt 
reduction, serious questioning arose over how the scheme was working in practice, the 
cost distribution, and the resulting risks among the various creditors as well as between 
them and the debtor countries.  Among these concerns, the following are worth 
highlighting (Garay, 1991a): 
 
i. The financial participation of the multi- and bilateral entities was deemed 
not large enough to resolve the debt problem.  This criticism was made by 
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influential actors in the international financial community, including the 
presidents of Midland Bank and Lloyds Bank, (Latin Finance, 1990), as 
well as by more frequently heard critics. 
 
ii. More generally, the overall need for external financial resources to finance 
growth and investment in the highly indebted economies was 
underestimated.  One sign that countries would be under funded was that 
debt and debt-service reductions were barely one third of the discount 
prevailing in the secondary market, meaning that the cash flow savings 
would be less than the market was implicitly projecting as needed.  
 
iii. The multilateral entities put themselves at increased risk in how they lent to 
the highly indebted countries, i.e., by lending to help the countries purchase 
partial guarantees of repayment in the form of zero-coupon US Treasury 
bonds, rather than for domestic capital formation and growth in the debt-
crisis countries.  
 
iv. The massive conversion of bank debt into marketable debt securities was 
seen to have restricted the flexibility of policy makers in handling future 
debt crises, as it was thought that “Brady bonds” would not be subject to 
restructuring (However, Ecuador’s subsequent default on and restructuring 
of Brady bonds showed this not to be necessarily the case, although bond 
restructuring had been quite rare in the 1980s and in most of the 1990s). It 
had seemed as though the new bonds would be treated as senior to 
commercial bank debt in any future debt renegotiation, degrading the 
traditional standing of bank loans as pari passu with all other non-
collateralized private lending to the sovereign. 
 
   
In other words, while removing the “bad debtor” image of the debt crisis countries, the 
Brady Plan provided an exit opportunity for the creditor banks and that seemed to presage 
a long-term loss of flexibility in foreign private financing for developing countries, as 
more selective international securities investors increasingly substituted for international 
bank creditors, some of which had ongoing relationships with the borrowing countries 
and thus were more familiar with them. It was thus feared this would make the countries 
more dependent on other sources of external financing, including multilateral entities, 
governments and official agencies. Moreover, it was expected that the overall the degree 
of segmentation of financial access of developing countries would intensify, with the 
bond market, for one, differentiating between countries according to whether they had 
previously needed debt forgiveness or not and other criteria. In fact, the financial markets 
in the 1990s turned out to have a large appetite for developing country securities, 
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including those of formerly insolvent sovereigns. 
 
Even critics of the Brady Initiative, however, acknowledged that its approach to debt 
reduction should have been promoted in the early 1980’s, when it might have helped 
restore economic growth in the major borrowing countries at an earlier point in time. 
Brady had made the reduction of sovereign debt practical, offering a menu of options to 
banks under a market approach, and strengthening international cooperation among 
banks, multilateral agencies and government authorities of creditor countries.  The plan 
enabled the international system to avoid a systemic crisis that could have arisen from 
how different national legal systems might have reacted had it been necessary to force the 
banks to write down their claims on debtor countries. The creditor bloc favored the 
initiative for protecting its interests, not to mention for continuing to emphasize debtor 





6. AN ERA COMES TO A CLOSE 
 
While the Brady Plan removed one barrier to renewed private capital inflows into the 
debt-crisis countries, the liberalization of the controls on capital flows that spread across 
the developing world in the early 1990s removed another. Financial flows – in particular, 
short-term and speculative finance – then surged into a number of developing countries. 
Also, international bonds, including placements by sovereign borrowers from developing 
countries, once again came to be a central form of medium-term financing. The global 
demand for international securities – equities as well as bonds – burgeoned, with mutual 
funds and even households joining traditional and new forms of institutional investors by 
the end of the decade. In other words, financial globalization was rapidly advancing in 
the world as a whole in the 1990s, carried by a progressively sophisticated and complex 
set of financial instruments and actors. This challenged the world’s governments to 
adequately strengthen regulatory institutions to supervise the flows and institutions in an 
opportune, strict and effective way. The world was also challenged to organize the 
capacity to mobilize sufficient and timely financial support to combat massive financial 
outflows when investors panicked in the newly open financial markets of emerging 
economies. International policy makers were further challenged to develop a more 
adequate mechanism for coordination of the world’s main central banks. The suggestion 
that the IMF could become a kind of global central bank did not take root, and by the end 
of the decade policy makers foreswore any more massive bailouts. And if the 1990s 
brought the commercial banks’ involvement in debt crises to a close, it also left the world 
without a mechanism or a process to deal with the next wave of sovereign insolvencies, 
which would no longer involve commercial banks in a central way. 
 
6.1. Renewed confidence in emerging markets 
 
The capital surges into developing countries first helped strengthen them and then 
highlighted their weaknesses. The experience of many developing countries during the 
early nineties is illustrative. It began with a period of financial bonanza, based not on 
new loans to governments, as had been the tradition in the past, but the massive entrance 
of strictly private capital (i.e. portfolio capital and foreign direct investment, short-term 
and speculative finance).  Indeed, the net private capital inflow into developing countries 
amounted near $540 billion over the period 1990-1994 (World Bank, 1994).  
 
This massive capital inflow to developing countries had multiple causes. As Goldstein 
(1995) has argued, “the fall in industrial-country interest rates was probably the most 
important driving force but also a policy performance in host countries along with certain 
changes in the operating environment also figured prominently in the outcome.” Another 
potential contributory factor is contagion as a “process by which changes in market 
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assessments for some borrowers lead to sequential changes in assessments (in the same 
direction) for other borrowers, above that implied by the latter’s true creditworthiness. 
Positive contagion is often mentioned as a factor enlarging net private flows to 
developing countries in 1992-1993.”  
 
The financial inflow was managed with an orthodox “sterilizing” monetary policy, 
absorbing the domestic liquidity surpluses through the increased sale of government 
securities in the financial market, in order not to disrupt tight anti-inflationary stances.  
This led to further increases in domestic interest rates and raised the profitability of 
domestic financial investment relative to abroad, promoting a larger capital inflow. The 
attraction of funds to the region was abetted by a sharp fall in international interest rates, 
which stimulated a further financial outflow, in particular, from the US economy and an 
insufficient reactivation of economic activity there.  A vicious circle was set in motion in 
the emerging economies favoring the entrance of speculative capital, reserve 
accumulation, national currency revaluation, commercial deficit aggravation and further 
rise of domestic interest rates. In presence of high capital mobility internationally, 
sterilization policy becomes less effective the longer it is applied. This was an important 
reason why “a group of developing countries [were] wrestling over 1990-1994 with how 
to conduct macroeconomic, exchange rate, and supervisory policy in the face of a 
cumulative capital inflow” (Goldstein, 1995).  
 
One consequence of this foreign exchange bonanza fell on sovereign external debt 
management, as there was a rapid and extended rise in the price of the remaining 
“distressed” sovereign bank debt in the secondary market.  This reflected in part the 
serious progress in economic recovery and the structural reforms that many countries had 
undertaken. It also embodied recognition that a good number of economies had 
experienced an abrupt increase in international reserves, and, therefore, in their external 
payment capacity. The down side of this good news was it reduced the space for 
conducting exchange and repurchase operations of outstanding bank debt at a discount. In 
many countries, such as Chile, Venezuela and Colombia, the level of transactions in the 
secondary market for sovereign bank debt fell or practically disappeared, as creditors 
increasingly considered themselves sufficiently safe under a medium term perspective in 
terms of the timely fulfillment of the contractual obligations of these debtor countries. 
 
At the same time, there were increasing reasons to worry about the vulnerability of all 
these economies to a sudden flight of speculative capital. As it turned out, the reserve 
levels in most of the countries were wholly inadequate in the face of financial panics in 
open financial markets, and risky fiscal and exchange-rate policies in several countries 
would give investors reasons for concern. Precisely such situations came to pass towards 
the end of 1994 in Mexico, in 1997 in some East Asian countries, in 1998 in Russia and 
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Brazil, and at the beginning of the current decade in Argentina, only to mention the most 
widely known examples. 
 
6.2. Sovereign insolvency with bonds instead of bank loans 
 
The Brady Plan and the secondary market in syndicated bank debt had brought the 1980s 
debt crisis to a close, essentially by creating an “exit strategy” for the commercial banks 
to take their losses and move on. The subsequent surge in capital inflows and the 
increasing access of emerging market borrowers to the international bond market masked 
a concern that became apparent to the investing community by the end of the 1990s: there 
was no mechanism to deal with defaults on bonds comparable to what had evolved for 
commercial bank debt. Even in the case of the commercial banks, it’s important to stress, 
the international financial institutions needed to intervene to ensure the debt restructuring. 
Creditors and debtors had been unable to come to an agreement on their own.  The 
problem was seen by the Deputy Managing-Director of IMF, Anne O. Krueger (2002), as 
follows, 
 
“I am very satisfied with the widespread consensus about the nature of the 
problem which we are facing:  that is, the lack of adequate incentives for an 
orderly and timely restructuring of the unsustainable sovereign debts.  Under the 
current arrangement, the international community is facing a choice between 
accepting a potentially contagious situation of individual default or conducting the 
rescue of the private creditors and contributing to the reproduction of the moral 
hazard….” 
 
One problem caused by the shift to bond financing was the loss of a suitable 
jurisprudence to handle situations of default of debtor country governments. While bond 
contracts had some clauses that were similar to the ones in syndicated bank loans that had 
brought individual creditor banks together to jointly seek a workout (such as cross-
default, pari-passus and negative pledge), other clauses made a cooperative solution 
more difficult. One such is the “acceleration” clause, in which a specified minority of 
bondholders could make the outstanding balance on the bond fully and immediately 
repayable after some event such as a missed interest payment. Once a bond was 
“accelerated”, a bondholder could run to a court and ask it to enforce the immediate 
repayment on the complaining investor’s holdings. The incentive to do so was the 
knowledge that the borrower had some funds, if not enough to cover all its obligations, 
and so the first to seek collection would be the most likely to be successful. Also, unlike 
in bank loans, there was no “sharing” clause in sovereign bond contracts. Any successful 




The absence of other clauses was also said to make a negotiation between the debtor and 
its numerous, anonymous bondholders to exchange, swap or restructure its bonds 
extremely difficult. In particular, absence of “collective action clauses” (CACs) in bonds 
issued under New York law was said to make it seriously difficult to bring together and 
persuade the bondholders to participate in new financing, be it “voluntary” or “semi-
voluntary”. However, CACs already existed in bonds issued under British law, defining 
how holders of an individual bond issue were to arrange to change the financial terms of 
their bond if needed and what specific “super-majority” would be required to reach a 
decision. New York law bonds had required unanimous consent, although “exit consents” 
(discussed elsewhere in this book) developed as a way to work around that difficulty. 
 
Nevertheless, by the middle of the present decade CACs became a standard part of new 
bond contracts. Some of them also contained “aggregation” clauses, which provided a 
way for holders of one bond to participate with holders of other bonds in a joint 
renegotiation with the sovereign debtor. The idea was that as existing bond issues were 
rolled over into new bonds with CACs as they matured, the process would generalize into 
a means to renegotiate a growing share of any country’s outstanding bonds. The question 
remains, however, whether or how they would work in a sovereign financing crisis. The 
key point is that bonds are not bank loans, their contractual terms are still more 
centrifugal than centripetal; and bondholders are not bankers, their relationship with the 
borrower is different, and leadership on the creditor side by banks with a continuing 
interest in the country cannot be assumed.  
 
A final element that is potentially different between current bond-based and 1980s bank-
based debt in crisis situations is the relationship of the creditors and sovereign debtor 
with the rest of the international community. General proclamations aside, it is not clear 
today what the relationship would be, especially following the recent Argentine workout. 
A strong relationship could be attractive if it embodied the prior committed support of 
IMF, the multilateral banks and the governments of the key developed countries, 
especially the United States, to provide financing (or guarantees) to debtor countries 
should they face liquidity problems (the commitments might be included in multi-year 
adjustment programs). Another device could be to add an automatic renewal clause to 
official loans, to be available over a specific period to use in situations of lack of liquidity 
(not insolvency), carrying a penalty rate of interest to avoid “moral hazard”. IMF 
approval could be required to invoke such a clause, which would put it in the context of 






As this chapter has described, the international financial architecture underwent major 
changes in the 1980s to handle the debt that developing country governments owed and 
could not pay to commercial banks, and it is undergoing further reform to adjust to 
primarily bond financing. Possibilities exist to increase the margin for maneuver of 
debtor countries and reduce the systemic risks and ensuing costs of crises in the payments 
capacities of debtor countries, as well as bring greater fluidity and less instability and 
unpredictability to their sovereign financing. Reform, however, is not easy. It should be 
remembered, in this regard, that it took most of a decade to reach the eventual workout 
process for commercial bank debt:  
 
“Five years and more than five workout cases were required for the commercial 
bank process to metamorphose from a series of experiments to a recognizable 
process.  This process was refined over another eight years and more than one 
hundred rescheduling deals before debt reduction was introduced under the Brady 
Plan at the end of the 1980s debt crisis… [The] ease of restructuring bank debt is 
more myth than reality. The process … diverted the attention of policymakers 
from implementing essential reforms, it resulted in deals that never seemed 
generous enough to voters, and it was more expensive than the Paris Club 
process. Nor was it easy from the creditor perspective of the [Group of 7]. 
Considerable arm-twisting and cajoling was required to bridge the gap between 
offers from the banks and requests from the debtor countries” (Rieffel, 2003).   
 
One reason the process was difficult is that it embodied major reallocations of financial 
resources. Some creditors, including many banks, suffered losses (if not initially), but 
there were also many in the international private sector who profited handsomely.  These 
included the financial intermediaries who bought impaired bank debt at a steeper discount 
than was contained in the final settlement. Significant resource transfers also took place 
within the debtor countries, as when private sector foreign debt was taken over by the 
government. Similarly, resources were reallocated when decentralized public sector (e.g., 
state enterprise) debt was shifted to the central government, followed by privatization 
under unfavorable arrangements in terms of the social costs then incurred by the 
population and the potential profitability of the enterprises foregone. It would be hard to 
make a full accounting of who benefited and who lost in the debt crisis years, or to 
measure if there was any correspondence with the degree of joint responsibility for the 
crisis. What is evident is that the net benefit in the outcome was inferior to what was 
expected. 
 
The international reform process had been shaped by the political, economic and 
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financial power relations between the international creditors – governments of developed 
countries, multilateral entities, bilateral agencies, commercial banks and other financial 
entities – and the debtor developing nations on one hand, and the conflicts of interests, 
the differences in socio-economic situations and the political and institutional 
discrepancies among major debtor countries on the other. The outcome was the 
“individualist” (case-by-case) approach to handling the 1980s debt crisis. Not only did 
this privilege short-term financial relations between each separate debtor nation and its 
international creditors, but it also prevented the configuration of a cartel of Third World 
debtor countries, even among a set of neighbor countries with relatively common 
traditions and interests as in Latin America.  In this sense, the creditor bloc succeeded 
very well in managing the debt problem so as to prevent the emergence of political and 
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